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After reaching a historic peak by the end of the 1990s, homicides in 
large cities in the state of São Paulo dropped sharply. Several 
explanations have been advanced, most prominently improvements in 
policing, adoption of policies such as dry laws, and increased 
incarceration. In this paper, we show that demographic changes play a 
large role in explaining the dynamics of homicide. More specifically, 
we present evidence of a strong co-movement between the proportion 
of males on the 15-25 age bracket and homicides at the statewide and 
at city levels, and argue that the relationship is causal. We estimate 
that a 1% increase in the proportion of 15-to-24-year-old males causes 
a 4.5% increase in homicides. 
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I. Introduction 
 
After increasing steadily over the 1990s, homicides in the state of São Paulo fell 
sharply in the 2000s. As an illustration, there were 24 homicides per 100thd inhabitants 
over the year 2005 at the São Paulo Metropolitan Area (SPMA), down from 52 in the 
1999 peak, and more than 20% less than the level in 1992. The dynamics are similar to 
that of the large American cities, where homicides peaked ten years before. Better than 
































































Figure I: Aggregating all 39 cities in the SPMA
Source: Secretaria de Segurança Pública de São Paulo (SSP-SP)

































































Source: Secretaria de Segurança Pública de São Paulo (SSP-SP)
City of São Paulo
Homicides
 































































Figure III: Aggregating all 38 cities in the SPMA except São Paulo
Source: Secretaria de Segurança Pública de São Paulo (SSP-SP)





















































Figure IV: All Cities larger then 100thd inhabitants
Source: Secretaria de Segurança Pública de São Paulo (SSP-SP)




Figures I-IV summarize the motivation for this paper. Although the spotlight was 
always on the SPMA in general, and the city of São Paulo in particular, the homicides 
movements are similar across the board, at least in middle sized to large cities (more than 
100thd inhabitants).
1 Comparing figure IV with the other three figures, one can see 
considerable cross-city variation in levels but, overtime, there is a remarkable similarity 
in the dynamics of homicides (see table I for more details): in all four groups depicted 
above homicide increased throughout the 1990s, peaked in 1999 and fell dramatically 
thereafter. Our research question is straightforward: what role did demographics play in 
explaining dynamics of homicide in the state of São Paulo over this period? 
As usual, there are many other culprits. Not surprisingly, the government of the 
state of São Paulo claim credit.
2 Indeed, several improvements in policing occurred 
somewhat concurrently. Among them, the adoption of a unified data and intelligence 
system, INFOCRIM (a version of Compustat), and the implementation of a photo 
database of criminals are the most prominent. Incarcerated population and the number of 
                                                 
1 Graphs for all cities with more then 100thd inhabitants are available upon request. 
2 As we shall see shortly, policing is done mainly at state-level in Brazil.   4
police officers also increased over the period although, as usual, it is hard to disentangle 
cause and effect. Among municipal-level policy measures, several others are worth 
mentioning: the adoption “dry laws” (which are restrictions on the recreational sales of 
alcohol), the creation of municipal police forces, the adoption of DISQUE-DENÚNCIA 
(an anonymous hotline to denounce crimes), and efforts to enforce the banning of 
possession of armed guns (see Kahn and Zanetic [2005]).
3  
As we will see, while it is conceivable that all these measures indeed helped 
reducing homicides, they cannot account for the dynamics observed in the data, neither 
one-by-one nor as a whole. “Dry laws”, for example, can be dismissed on two grounds. 
First, their adoption is not nearly as widespread as the drop in homicides in the end of the 
1990s. Second, adoption occurred after 2000. Since there is evidence that they caused a 
non-negligible reduction in homicides, it is likely that “dry laws” were a contributing 
factor, strengthening a trend that was already in place but it is simply impossible that they 
might have caused it.
4 In section IV, we provide a timeline of adoption of other policy 
measures and argue, one by one, that they cannot possibly explain the data. 
 We show that demography played a significant role in explaining the dynamics 
of homicide in the state of São Paulo. There is a remarkable co-movement between 
homicides and of the proportion of male between 15 and 25 years olds, the age-gender 
group most inclined to committing crimes.
5 Over the 1991-2000 period, when homicides 
rose 63.2%, the SPMA gained some 216,000 15-to-25-year-olds, a 15.3% increase 
against a population increase of 11.6. In contrast, over the 2000-2005 period, while its 
population increased 6.6%, the SPMA lost some 60,000 young males.
6 
 
                                                 
3 From 2003, the “Disarmament Act” (Lei do Desarmamento, Lei Nº 10.826) is a federal act that increased 
significantly the penal and civil costs of illegal possession and trade of fire guns. See 
http://www.camara.gov.br/internet/infdoc/Publicacoes/html/pdf/Desarmamento.pdf   
4 By comparing homicide dynamics in adopting and non-adopting municipalities in the SPMA, Biderman, 
De Mello and Schneider [2007] estimate that “dry laws” caused a reduction of roughly 12% in homicides.  
5 At the individual level, criminal involvement and age is one of the most robust relationships in all social 
sciences, dating back to at least Goring [1913]. A very non-exhaustive list of more recent work would 
include Wilson and Herrnstein [1985], Blumstein [1995] and Cook and Laub [1998]. 
6 While crime has been increasing in the United States in general, large cities such as Chicago, Los Angeles 
and New York experienced a drop in crime. Among the several candidates, only improvements in policing 
and demographic change survive scrutiny. See Skogan [2003]. For example, the three cities combined lost 
some 200,000 young males over the 2000-2005 period. See also The Economist, “New Police Model,” June 
9
th, 2007.   5
  Evidently, this correlation is not conclusive. For one thing, the co-movement may 
be a sheer coincidence. When one analyzes particular cities, the same pattern arises in 
general, which is all the more suggestive but makes it more difficult to disentangle time 
effects that may be causing both homicides and demography from a clean causal effect. 
Fortunately, however, there is sufficient variation across cities on the time-series of 
demography to estimate the effect of demography on homicides. After controlling for 
year and city effects, we find a significant elasticity of homicides to the proportion of 
young males: a 1% increase in the proportion of males between 15 and 25 years old is 
associated with a 5% increase in homicides.  
  It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this result. First, crime in general, 
and violent types such as homicides in particular, are a serious and costly social 
phenomenon. Second, there has been an enormous debate on the causes of the recent drop 
in homicides in the SPMA. Our results are negative in one sense and positive in another. 
Negative in the sense that policy played a secondary role. Positive in the sense of figure 
V: the spike in homicides observed in the 1990s is a side effect of the so-called 
“demographic bonus” that Brazil has been experiencing. Figures V.A, V.B and V.C show 
the distribution of males in the SPMA for three years: 1993, 1999 and 2005. 
Year 1993
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Figure V.A Source: Fundação SEADE
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Year 1999
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%

















Figure V.B Source: Fundação SEADE
 
Year 2005
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%

















Figure V.C Source: Fundação SEADE
 
  There is pronouncedly large cohort (reaching their thirties now) that resembles a 
“wave” moving up the demographic pyramid.    7
The case for demographics as an explaining factor demands that young males are 
particularly crime prone. While incarceration data is scant in São Paulo, there is a best 
alternative: hospital data, from which one can recover the age of homicide victims. 
Figure VI depicts the statewide distribution of homicide victims in the year 2000.
7 
 







Figure VI Source: DATASUS
 
  
  The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the data used and 
show some preliminary results. Using victim data, we construct age-specific homicide 
rates, and perform a simple Oxaca-Blinder type decomposition. Keeping 1992 murder 
rates by age bracket constant, how much of the dynamics of homicides can be explained 
by changes in demographics? As we will see, although demographics fail to pin down the 
level, they explain some 70% of the time-series variation in homicides. When high-
school drop-outs are factored in, demographics performance in explaining the level 
                                                 
7 Ideally, one would like to observe the age of the perpetrator, not the victim. Nevertheless, perpetrators and 
victims are usually similar in socio-economic terms, allowing us to interpret figure VII as evidence that 
demographics, at a minimum, strongly correlate with homicides.   8
improves dramatically. This suggests that unsurprising fact that the effect of young male 
on crime is mitigated by having a viable non-criminal alternative. 
  Clearly, time may have caused both homicides and demography. For this reason, 
cross-city variation is added in section III. Regressions results show that the link from 
demographics to homicide survives the inclusion of time specific dummies. In fact, after 
controlling for time and city effects, a 1% increase in the proportion of young males (age 
15 to 34) causes a ?? increase in homicide. Therefore, one can be confident that there is 
indeed a strong causal link from the proportion of male youths to homicide.  
While our estimates are in line with long established the individual-level evidence 
from criminology, they contrast with some works that have failed to find a large impact 
of demography on aggregate crime rates with U.S. data (Levitt [1999]).
8 Although 
offenders are male and young, the proportion of crime prone individuals may not change 
sufficiently over time to influence aggregate crime rates.  
Results can be somewhat reconciled by keeping in mind that, although being in a 
crime-prone age bracket matters, also important is being out of the school system. In this 
sense, our results are compatible with Levitt and Donohue [2001].
9 Or perhaps a 
changing age structure will matter most in poorer, extremely unequal, weak law-and-
order environments such as the state of São Paulo.  
In section IV we enumerate a long list of alternative explanations. We show that, 
while other factors may have contributed to the decline in murder rates in the 2000s, they 
cannot explain time-series pattern of the data, particularly the inversion that occurred in 
late 1990s. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Data and the Time Series Decomposition 
 
We use four sources of data. City-level homicide data comes from the Secretaria 
de Segurança Pública de São Paulo (SSP-SP), the state-level enforcement authority.
10 
                                                 
8 See footnote 5. 
9 Levitt and Donohue [2001] investigate the role played by legalized abortion in explaining the 1990 
reversion of crime trends in the U.S., finding a large impact. Their (rather controversial) interpretation is 
that legalized abortion reduced the supply of crime prone individuals.  
10 In Brazil, by constitutional law, police enforcement is a state attribution.   9
City-level murder rates from 1991 to 2005 are available for the cities in São Paulo 
Metropolitan (SPMA), and from 1997 to 2005 for the rest of the large cities in the state.  
As an alternative, we use state-level aggregate victim data, by age bracket, for the 
1984-2004, from the Serviço Único de Saúde (SUS) database (DATASUS). The SUS is 
the federal government run national health system, subordinated to the Ministry of 
Health. DATASUS data is at the hospital level, which means that homicides are allocated 
to the city where the hospital in which the victim died is, which is not necessarily where 
the murder occurred. When using aggregate data over many cities, SSP-SP and 
DATASUS data are equivalent.
11 However, for the procedures using cross-city variation, 
one should be cautious with DATASUS data. Therefore, for all city-level procedures, 
SSP-SP data is used. 
Demographic data are from the 1990 and the 2000 census, and the intermediate 
population, available from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE).
12 
Finally, city-level high school drop-out rate is from the Secretaria Estadual de Educação, 
the state-level authority. 
  Table I shows some descriptive statistics for SPMA and for all other cities with 
more 100thd inhabitant, for three periods: 1991-1995, 1996-2000, and 2001-2005. Two 
key variables are depicted: homicide rates and % of male population in the 15-24 age 
group. To keep consistency with the decomposition below, we use DATASUS data, and 
only male homicide victims are considered.
13 
 
                                                 
11 They are not precisely equal because some homicides do not go on hospitals´ records, but the figures are 
very similar. 
12 The IBGE is an autarky below the Ministry of Planning, equivalent of a Bureau of Statistics. 
13 Roughly 93% of all homicide victims are male, which makes the distinction irrelevant.   10
Homicide Rate§ % Male 15-24 Homicide Rate§ % Male 15-24
1991-1995 41.79 9.37 15.83 9.36
1996-2000 54.66 9.58 25.54 9.58
2001-2005 45.95 9.18 23.87 9.37
TABLE I: Means for three different periods
†: Cities in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area
‡: Cities with more than 100thd inhabitants in 2000
§: per 100thd inhabitants
Source: DATASUS and Instituto Brasiliero de Geografia e Economia (IBGE)
SPMA† OTHER LARGE CITIES‡
 
 
In an unpolished way, table I contains the story of the paper. Homicides rates and 
the percentage of males between 15 and 24 years old move together over time. 
Suggestively, in large cities outside the SPMA, where the demography varied less, crime 
also varied less. 
To assess how much the demography explains of the time-series pattern of crime 
we perform two Oxaca-Blinder-type decompositions. The DATASUS data has 
information on the victims’ age, which can be used as proxy for age group specific 
homicide rates.
14  
Let Hta be the homicide victim rate of age group a in year t. Victims are divided 
into nine groups, and t = 1991, 1992,…., 2004.
15 Let Pat  be the proportion of the 





ta ta t H P H  
Define 
τ ta H as the homicide rate that would prevail in year t if age group specific 




ta a ta H P H τ τ  
                                                 
14 Levitt [1999] uses incarceration data, which is generated on the offender side, a better but unavailable 
measure. 
15 Groups are 0-4, 5-14, 15-24, 25-34,35-44,45-54,55-64,65-74 and over 75. 
16 The “actual” homicide is rate is the sum of homicides over the sum of population.    11
τ ta H is used a rough prediction of what would the homicide rate be in year τ if the 
demography changed but the level of homicides of year t were kept constant. Figures 
VIII and IX show predicted and actual homicides for the 1984-2004 and 1991-2004 
periods, holding homicide victim rates of 1984 and 1991, respectively. 
 
Predicted versus Actual
























Figure VII Source: DATASUS and Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. 
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Predicted versus Actual




























Figure VIII Source: DATASUS and Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. 
  Visual inspection of figures VIII and IX show two facts. First, there is a 
remarkable co-movement between the two series. This is true for the whole 1984-2004 
period, and for the sub-period 1991-2004. Second, demographic changes do not pin down 
the level of homicides. Table II shows some OLS regressions of actual on predicted 
homicides. They serve two purposes. First, get a sense of variation of actual homicides 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)† (5)§




















# Obs 21 21 21 21 20
R
2 0.73 0.58 0.88 0.20 0.23
Phillips-Perron‡ 0.51 0.55 0.00





Dependent Variable: Actual Homicides, 1984-2004
Source: DATASUS, Instituto Brasiliero de Geografia e Economia (IBGE) and authors' computations
Constant
***: significant at the 1% level
*: significant at the 10% level
**: significant at the 5% level
†: Dependent Variable is the residuals of a fractional polynomial regression of actual homicides on four-degree polynomio of year
§: First-Difference Regression
‡: Phillips-Perron p-value test for stationary of the residuals 
 
  In column (1) the raw relationship between predicted and actual is shown. As 
expected, predicted homicide explain a significant part of the variation in actual 
homicides: 73%. There is no evidence, however, that their relationship is stable: residuals 
are not stationary, which indicates that the two series do not co-integrate. The very large 
estimated coefficient reflects the fact that predicted homicides do not pin down the level 
of actual homicides. Visual inspection of figures VIII and IX suggests regressing actual 
homicides on year and year
2 (results in column (2)). Interestingly, predicted homicides do 
a better job at explaining actual homicides than the 2-degree polynomial of time (58% 
versus 78%). In column (3), instead of horseracing, the polynomial and predicted 
homicides are included. Three facts are noteworthy: 1) predicted homicides survive the 
inclusion of a polynomial of time; 2) predicted homicides explain, above and beyond the 
polynomial, an additional 20% of the variation in actual homicides; 3) the residuals are 
now stationary. 
  In column (4), a fractional polynomial regression in implemented: actual 
homicides are regressed against a four-degree polynomial.
17 Residuals were then 
regressed against predicted homicides. Predicted homicides are still related to actual 
homicides and explain some 20% of its variation, a number similar to the one in column 
                                                 
17 The procedure chooses an optimal polynomial of four terms. Details are available upon request.   14
(3). The two series, however, are not co-integrated (Phillips-Perron test for residual 
stationary p – value = 55%). Finally, in column (5) we run the model in first differences 
because both actual and predicted are integrated of order 1. The coefficient on predicted 
homicides is similar to those in columns (1) and (3) and, when series are differentiated 
they co-integrate.  
Evidently, this should not be viewed as “causal” effect of demographic changes. 
For one thing, these models are statistical models, with little economic content. Second, 
there is no reason to believe that changing demographic will not affect the level of 
homicide itself. In fact, social interaction effects already documented in the literature 
suggest that, an increase in the crime prone age population should increase the level of 
homicide rates (see Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman [1996]). In this sense, the 
predicted effect of demography should be viewed with care, most likely a lower bound of 
the true causal effect (as results in the next section suggest). Figure X shows the 
evolution of homicide victim rates by age group.  
 





















































Homicide Rate 15-24 Homicide Rate 25-34
Homicide Rate 35-44 Homicide Rate 45-54
Figure IX Source: DATASUS
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There seems to be a common component across age groups. However, 
movements in homicide rates are much more pronounced in the 15-24 and 25-34 groups. 
This suggests that most of the variation in homicide rates is explained by the variation in 
deaths among the more crime prone age groups, particularly the 15-24 group.  
 
 
III. Panel Evidence 
 
  Ultimately demography and crime are not randomly determined but are choices of 
the agents. Consequently, the relationship between demography and homicides may 
suffer from the usual problems: of reverse causality and omission of common 
determinants. Additionally, using time series variation alone one cannot dismiss the 
possibility that the relation arising in figures VIII and IX, and table II are a product of a 
sheer coincidence (although demography and homicides seem related above and beyond 
the inclusion of a high-order polynomial of time).   
  Reverse causation seems highly improbable, at least as a first order phenomenon 
empirically. It is true that homicide victims are concentrated in the male age bracket 15-
24. There are, however, too few murders to make a significant difference. For an 
illustration, at its 1999 peak, the city of São Paulo had 2418 homicides whose victims 
were 15-to-24-year-old males. Although the number is certainly very high, it amounts to 
no more than 0.25% of the 969,241 young males living in São Paulo that year. 
Furthermore, reverse causation, in this case, would bias the estimated relationship 
between demographics and crime towards zero 
Demography has two pillars. One is fertility and mortality, which largely 
produced by decision made several years - if no decades - before. Second is migration, a 
shorter-term decision. Similarly, crime is a decision made in the present. From the first 
channel (fertility), there is little chance that demography and crime have a common 
cause. Migration is more challenging for the estimation strategy, and it is further 
discussed below.    
  In this subsection we estimate how demography impacts violent crime using, 
along with variation over time, how demography evolved in different large cities in the   16
state of São Paulo. Cross-city variation has the obvious advantage of allowing to evaluate 
the “coincidence” explanation. Let i be a city and t be a year. The estimated model is: 
 















1 0 1524 log log
ε ι τ
β β
                    (1) 
Homicides are rates per 100thd inhabitants, Male1524 is the percentage of 15-24 
year-old males. TIMEt  is a full set of year dummies, and CITYi  is a full set of city 
dummies. Controls, in some specifications, will include the log of population and the log 
of the high-school dropout rate. These two controls are quite important for our purposes. 
First, population will capture migration movements, the component of demography that 
is a product of current choices of agents. Second, it may be easier to maintain youngsters 
at school if there fewer of them.  
With a panel structure, one can discard all pure time-series variation (and all pure 
cross-city variation), leaving only how demography changed differently in different cities 
as a source of variation to estimate its impact on homicides. Several more layers of 
coincidence are now necessary to produce the results spuriously. Second, we can account 
for all time-invariant heterogeneity among cities, which helps identifying the effect of 
demography. Figures IX-XIV illustrates graphically the type of variation explored when 
estimating equation (1). The proportion of 15-24 year-old males and homicide rates are 
depicted for five large cities statewide.
18 
                                                 
18 We depict no more than five cities for the sake of conciseness. Several other cities would confirm the 
pattern.   17
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  São Paulo, São José dos Campos and Itapecirica follow the typical pattern: 
proportion of 15-24 year-old males increased until 2000 and fell thereafter, with 
homicides following the same pattern. However, where the proportion of 15-24 year-old 
males increased less pronouncedly, and fell less pronouncedly (São Paulo), homicides 
also went up smoothly and fell relatively smoothly. In other cities, such as São José and 
Itapecirica, the proportion of 15-24 year-old males increased smoothly, but then drop 
steeply, homicides also increase smoothly and then dropped pronouncedly. Finally, 
consider Suzano and Embu. In the former, the proportion of 15-24 year-old males fell 
throughout the 1997-2005 period, and homicides followed the same pattern. On the other, 
in Embu the proportion of 15-24 year-old males increased sharply until 2000, and so did 
homicides; from 2000 onwards, the proportion of 15-24 year-old males fell very subtly, 
and so did homicides.  
Table III present several models estimated using only data from the São Paulo 
Metropolitan Area (SPMA), in which case there is data starting in 1991.  
   20
TABLE III: Homicide Regression, SMPA 1991-2005 





























Year Dummies? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs  515 482 515 482 514 481 481
R
2 0.12 0.13 0.70 0.70 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.77




**: significant at the 5% level
***: significant at the 1% level
Log(Crime Age)t -  1
Log(Population)





C: High-school dropout rate, moving average over the second and third lags




Column (1) presents the simplest possible model, without city or year dummies 
and with no controls included. A 1% increase in the percentage of 15-24 year-old males 
is associated with 3.92% increase in homicides. To have a sense o practical importance, 
over the 1996-2000, there were 9.58% of young males in the SPMA, and 9.18% in the 
2001-2005 period (see table I), which represents a 4.2% difference. Therefore, the 
coefficient implies that 16.37% of the reduction in homicides, which actually fell some 
16% over the period.
19 Since it is not clear whether current or (recent) past demography 
matters, homicides are regressed on the lag of Male1524 (column (2)). Results are even 
stronger. 
  Interestingly, when city-fixed effects are accounted for, the impact of demography 
is stronger, for both contemporaneous and the lag (4.95% and 5.48%). As expected, 
including year dummies dampens results, and so does including the two controls. 
However, we can always reject the null hypothesis of that demography does not cause 
homicides at reasonable significant levels. The lowest possible estimates arise when the 
two controls, population and high-school drop-out rates. Neither population nor drop-out 
rates seem to belong to the equation, but the percentage of 15-24 year-old males do. At 
                                                 
19 This is an extrapolation of a local interpretation of the log-in-log regression.   21
the lowest estimate, changes in the Male1524 imply a reduction of 7.14% in homicides 
from the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s. Finally, in column (9), 
the most complete model is estimated using a moving average of MALE1524. Results, as 
expected, are between those in columns (7) and (8). In table IV, again using data from the 
SPMA, several econometric robustness checks are performed. For the sake of 
conciseness all models are estimated with the moving average of column (9). 
 
TABLE IV: Homicide Regression, SMPA 1991-2005 




















0.01 0.01 0.04 -1.62
(0.21) (0.40) (0.47) (0.59)
***
0.07 0.40 0.07 0.40





Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 481 481 482 481 436 436 317 316
R
2 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.83 0.83
F: Year ≥ 1997






D: GLS Regression, model for the error term: AR(1)
Log(population)
C: Weighted Least Squares, Weight = Population½
∆Log(Homicide Rate)t  - 1
E: Arellano-Bond GMM Regression, all varibles in first-differences
B: High-school dropout rate, moving average over the second and third lags
*: significant at the 10% level
**: significant at the 5% level
***: significant at the 1% level
A: Moving average over current and first lag
All regressions account for city fixed effects. All standard errors are White-Huber heteroskedastic corrected, unless otherwise 
noted
 
Four pairs of regressions are presented, including and not including the controls. 
All regressions account for city and year fixed effects. The first is a pair of Weighted 
Least Square regressions, in which the variance is modeled as a decreasing function of 
population. There are cities of wildly different sizes in the SPMA, and homicides are a 
relatively rare occurrence, observations from small cities are very noisy. Results are in 
line with those in column (9) table III. While in columns (1) and (2) the variance is   22
modeled, in columns (3) and (4) the autocorrelation in modeled as an AR(1) process. 
Results are stronger.  
In dynamic models, if the first lag belongs to the equation, and errors are auto-
correlated (which columns (3) and (4) suggest is the case), the first lag is endogenous, 
and all coefficients are biased. To account for this possibility, we estimate the model by 
GMM using lags of the regressors as instruments (see Arellano and Bond [1991] for 
details). Even after including the first lag of homicide, results are once more stronger 
(columns (7) and (8)).
20  
Finally, the model is estimated with the sample restricted to 1997 onwards, for 
two reasons. First, by shortening the sample on the time dimension, one reduces the odds 
that time-varying unobserved heterogeneity across cities is driving results. Second, 
results on the 1997-2005 period are comparable with the other sample used, of large 
cities statewide. Results are significantly stronger than those with the whole 1991-2005 
sample. Interestingly, increases in population seem to reduce crime. 
In table V, some of the models presented in tables III and IV are replicated for a 
sample of all cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants (belonging or not to the SPMA).
21 
 
                                                 
20 The model is estimated in first-difference. After estimating the model by GMM, we tested for first and 
second order autocorrelation on the error term. This is important because if second order autocorrelation is 
still present, coefficients could be biased if the second lag of homicides belongs to the equation. While first 
order autocorrelation is indeed present, after including the first lag of homicides second order correlation is 
not present. 



































0.06 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.15












Year Dummies? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 585 585 585 585  520 436 585 455 390 390
R
2 0.17 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.87




∆Log(Homicide Rate)t - 2
All regressions account for city fixed effects. All standard errors are White-Huber heteroskedastic corrected, unless otherwise noted. Average 
Log(Crime Age) and Drop-outs as defined in tables III and IV.
***: significant at the 1% level
**: significant at the 5% level
D: GLS Regression, model for the error term: AR(1)
E: Arellano-Bond GMM Regression, all varibles in first-differences
Source: Secretaria de Segurança Pública de São Paulo (SSP-SP) and Instituto Brasiliero de Geografia e Economia (IBGE)
TABLE V: Homicide Regression, Large Cities 1997-2005 
Log(Crime Age)
∆Log(Homicide Rate)t - 1
*: significant at the 10% level
A: Simple OLS 
B: City-fixed effects included
C: Weighted Least Squares, Weight = Population½
 
 
Three important messages arise from the table V. First, when only the 1997-2005 
period is considered results are stronger than with the whole 1991-2005 period. The 
inclusion of large cities outside the SPMA does not change results in any significant way. 
We interpret these results as suggesting two facts. First, the phenomenon is wider than 
the SPMA. Second, with a shorter time length it is less likely that demography captures 
time-varying heterogeneity. Finally, confirm previous estimates, population seem to 
reduce homicides, and some models now suggest that more high-school drop-out rates 
increase homicide as one should expect. The coefficient on population is puzzling in the 
light of the previous literature on social interaction that would predict crime rates are 
higher in larger cities (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman [1996]). Our results suggest 
that, perhaps, economically dynamic and safer cities receive an influx of population. 
Since young males are more prone to moving, unobserved migration movements 
(imperfectly captured by population) would work towards biasing the impact of young 
males on homicides towards zero. 
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IV. Discussion: Alternative Explanations 
 
There are other contributing factors to explain the radical shift in the trend of 
homicides in the state of São Paulo in general, and in the SPMA in particular. As one 
would expect, there was a policy reaction to the rise in homicides during the 1990s, at the 
municipal, state and national levels. In table VI, the most relevant policies adopted from 
the second half of the 1990s through 2007 are listed. 
 
Policy Level Date
Creation of INFOCRIM, a database system of 
crime georeferencig 
SPMA and large 
cities
1999
SPMA and large 
cities
Executive order likining number of police officer 
to INFOCRIM
2007
Creation of DISQUE-DENÚNCIA, a anonymous 
crime hotline to deounce crime
State 2000
Creation of FOTOCRIM, a database of pictures 
of wanted and in prison
State 1999
2001
Adoption of "Dry Laws", legislation restrciting 




Effective implementation of FOTOCRIM as an 
instrument of photograph identification
State 2002
Creation of a Municipal Police Forces SPMA
C 1962-2003
D
Elaboration of the Plano de Combate aos 
Homicídios, with emphasis on capturing repeated 
murderers
State
Source: Kanh and Zanetic [2005] and Biderman, De Mello and Schneider [2007]
Table VI: Policy Interventions 
A: Adoption occurred in 16 out of the 39 cities that form the SPMA
B: Average adoption period is July-2002
C: 26 out of the 39 cities that form the SPMA have Municipal Police Forces
D: 7 Municipal Police Forces were created after 1998
Lei do Desarmamento ("Disarmament Law") National 2003
"Operação Saturação", a centralized, systematic 
and permanent operation in drug-trafficking areas
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Most likely, all these policy interventions have merits of their own. The presence 
of a Compustat system such as INFOCRIM surely helps law enforcement. It is quite 
conceivable that stricter gun controls will prevent many silly homicides.  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that policy interventions can account for the 
dynamics of homicide in the state of São Paulo. One reason is timing. All policy 
intervention occurred either exactly when the trend in homicides have been reversed 
(1999-2000), or afterwards. Although INFOCRIM was implemented in 1999, it became 
fully operational only in 2001, and data has not been used to determine local police force 
until now. The first implementation of dry laws was in 2001; municipal police forces 
have been created throughout the 1990s.  
It is quite conceivable that these policies have contributed to the decline in 
homicides in the 2000s, although dry laws are the only policy for which there is hard 
evidence of effectiveness (Biderman, De Mello and Schneider [2007]). Their absence 




We find that the age structure explain a significant part of the variation in 
homicides at state of São Paulo over the last 16 years. The reversal of homicides rates 
were of the same magnitude of that in the 1980-1990 period in large US cities, most 
prominently New York. 
These results are important per se for criminology science. While there is 
undisputable evidence that offenders are mostly for an specific age-gender group (males 
between 15 and 24 years old), whether age structure would appear at the aggregate level 
is not clear. Levitt [1999] finds a limited role for demography. Our result can reconcile 
these two seemingly opposing pieces of evidence. Although age structure must 
mechanically contribute to crime rates, whether it makes an aggregate difference will 
probably depend on law enforcement, the efficacy of the judicial system, institutional 
development, educational and labor opportunity for young males, etc. Perhaps, in the 
state of São Paulo, differently from the US, the environment was ripe for demography to 
“flourish” as a cause of homicides.   26
As for policy, these results are also important. While it is hard to influence 
demography in the short-run, sub-optimal policy over-reaction can be avoided if 
demography is the driving factor.    27
V. References 
 
ARELLANO, M. AND BOND, S. “Some Specification Tests for Panel Data: Monte 
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,” The Review of Economic 
Studies, 58(1991), 277-297. 
 
BIDERMAN, C., DE MELLO, J. AND SCHNEIDER, A. “Dry Law and Homicides: 
Evidence from the São Paulo Metropolitan Area,” Departamento de Economia, PUC-Rio: 
Texto para Discussão No 518, 2006 
 
BLUMSTEIN, A. “Prisons,” in WILSON AND PETERSILIA, eds., Crime, San 
Francisco: ICS Press. 
 
COOK, P. AND LAUB, J. “The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence,” in 
MOORE AND TONRY, eds., Crime and Justice: a Review of Research, Chicago: the 
University of Chicago Press, 1998.  
 
DONOHUE, J. AND LEVITT, S., “The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (2001), 379-420. 
 
GLAESER, E., SACERDOTE, B. AND SCHEINKMAN, J., “Crime and Social 
Interaction,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996), 507-48. 
 
GORING, C. The English Convict, Montclair: Patterson Smith, 1913. 
 
LEVITT, S., “The Limited Role of Changing Age Structure in Explaining Aggregate 
Crime Rates,” Criminology 37 (1999), 581-97. 
 
WILSON, J. AND HERRNSTEIN, R. Crime and Human Nature, New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1985.  
 
Departamento de Economia    PUC-Rio 
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro 
Rua Marques de Sâo Vicente 225  - Rio de Janeiro 22453-900, RJ 
    Tel.(21) 35271078     Fax (21) 35271084 
www.econ.puc-rio.br 
flavia@econ.puc-rio.br 